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Altruism in groups: an evolutionary games
approach⋄
Ilaria Brunetti⋆†, Rachid El-Azouzi⋆ and Eitan Altman†
Abstract—We revisit in this paper the relation between
evolution of species and the mathematical tool of evolutionary
games, which has been used to model and predict it. We indicate
known shortcoming of this model that restricts the capacity of
evolutionary games to model groups of individuals that share
a common gene or a common fitness function. In this paper we
provide a new concept to remedy this shortcoming in the standard
evolutionary games in order to cover this kind of behavior.
Further, we explore the relationship between this new concept
and Nash equilibrium or ESS. We indicate through the study
of some example in the biology as Hawk-Dove game, Stag-Hunt
Game and Prisoner’s Dilemma, that when taking into account a
utility that is common to a group of individuals, the equilibrium
structure may change dramatically. We also study the multiple
access control in slotted Aloha based wireless networks. We
analyze the impact of the altruism behavior on the performance
at the equilibrium.
I. INTRODUCTION
Evolutionary games become a central tool for predicting and
even design evolution in many fields. Its origins come from
biology where it was introduced by [7] to model conflicts
among animals. It differs from classical game theory by its
focusing on the evolution dynamics of the fraction of members
of the population that use a given strategy, and in the notion
of Evolutionary Stable Strategy (ESS, [7]) which includes
robustness against a deviation of a whole (possibly small)
fraction of the population who may wish to deviate. This
is in contrast with the standard Nash equilibrium concept
that only incorporates robustness against deviation of a single
user. It became perhaps the most important mathematical
tool for describing and modeling evolution since Darwin.
Indeed, on the importance of the ESS for understanding the
evolution of species, Dawkins writes in his book ”The Selfish
Gene” [4]: ”we may come to look back on the invention
of the ESS concept as one of the most important advances
in evolutionary theory since Darwin.” He further specifies:
”Maynard Smith’s concept of the ESS will enable us, for the
first time, to see clearly how a collection of independent selfish
entities can come to resemble a single organised whole. In
this paper, we identify inherent restrictions on the modeling
capacity of classical evolutionary games apply. Recently, the
evolutionary game theory has become of increased interest to
social scientists [5]. In computer science, evolutionary game
theory is appearing, some examples of applications can be
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found in multiple access protocols [10], multihoming[11] and
resources competition in the Internet [12].
The starting point of this theory is a situation of a
very large number of local pairwise interactions between
pairs of individuals that are randomly matched. In classical
evolutionary games (EG), each individual represents a selfish
player in a non-cooperative game that it plays with its
randomly matched adversary, and in which each player seeks
to maximize its utility. The originality of EG is in postulating
that this utility is the Darwinian fitness. The fitness should be
understood as the relative rate at which the behavior used by
the individual will increase. For a given share of behaviors
in the population, a behavior of an individual with a higher
fitness would thus result in a higher rate of its reproduction. We
make the observation that since classical EG associates with an
individual both the interactions with other individuals as well
as the fitness, then it is restricted to describing populations
in which the individual is the one that is responsible for the
reproduction and where the choice of its own strategies is
completely selfish. In biology, in some species like bees or
ants, the one who interacts is not the one who reproduces.
This implies that the Darwinian fitness is related to the entire
swarm and not to a single bee and thus, standard EG models
excludes these species in which the single individual which
reproduces is not the one that interacts with other individuals.
Furthermore, in many species, we find altruistic behaviors,
which may hurt the individual adopting it, favouring instead
the group he belongs to. Altruistic behaviors are typical of
parents toward their children: they may incubate them, feed
them or protect them from predator’s at a high cost for
themselves. Another example can be found in flock of birds:
when a bird sees a predator it gives an alarm call to warn
the rest of the flock, attracting the predators attention to itself.
Also the stinging behavior of bees is an altruistic one: it serves
to protect the hive, but its lethal for the bee which strives. In
human behavior, many phenomena where individuals do care
about other’s benefits in their groups or about their intentions
can be observed in the real word. It must be admitted that some
phenomena require an explanation in terms of genes which
pursue their own interest to the disadvantage of the individual.
Hence the assumption of selfishness becomes inconsistent with
the real behavior of individual in a population.
Founders of classical EG seem to have been well aware
of this problem. Indeed, Vincent writes in [15] ”Ants seem
to completely subordinate any individual objectives for the
good of the group. On the other hand, the social foraging
of hyenas demonstrates individual agendas within a tight-knit
social group (Hofer and East, 2003). As evolutionary games,
one would ascribe strategies and payoffs to the ant colony,
while ascribing strategies and payoffs to the individual hyenas
of a pack.” In the case of ants, the proposed solution is thus to
model the ant colony as a player. Within the CEG paradigm,
this would mean that we have to consider interactions between
ant colonies. This however does not allow us anymore to
model behavior at the level of the individual.
In this work we present a new model for evolutionary
games, in which the concept of the agent as a single individual
is substituted by that of the agent as a whole group of
individuals. This new concept, named Group Equilibrium
Stable Strategy (GESS), allow to model competition between
individuals in a population in which the whole group shares a
common utility. Even if we still consider pairwise interactions
among individuals, our perspective is completely different: we
suppose that individuals are simple actors of the game and
that the utility to be maximized is the one of their group.
Our study of evolutionary games under the altruism inside
each group, is built around the ESS. We begin by defining
the GESS, deriving it in several ways and exploring its major
characteristics. The main focus of this paper is to study how
this new concept changes the profile of population and to
explore the relationship between GESS and Nash equilibrium
or ESS. We characterize through the study of many GESS and
we show how the evolution and the equilibrium are influenced
by the groups’ size as well as by their immediate payoff.
We also provide some primary results through an example
on multiple access games, in which any local interaction does
not lead to same payoff depending on the type of individuals
that are competing, and not only the strategy used. In such
application, we evaluate the impact of altruism behavior on
the performance of the system.
The paper is structured as follows. We first provide in the
next section the needed background on evolutionary games.
In the section III we then study the new natural concept
GESS and the relationship between GESS and ESS or Nash
equilibrium. The characterization of the GESS is studied in
section IV. Section V provides some numerical illustration
through some famous examples in evolutionary games. In
section VI we study the multiple access control in slotted
Aloha under altruism behavior. The paper closes with a
summary in section VII
II. CLASSICAL EVOLUTIONARY GAMES AND ESS
We consider an infinite population of players and we
assume that each member of the population has the same set
of available pure strategies K = {1, 2, ..,m}. We suppose
that each individual is repeatedly paired off with an other
individual randomly selected within the population. A player
may use a mixed strategy p ∈ ∆(K) where ∆(K) = {p ∈
R
m
+ |
∑
i∈K pi = 1}. Here p is a probability measure over the
set of actions K. This is the case where an individual has the
capacity to produce a variety in behaviours. Alternatively, the
mixed strategy p can be interpreted as the vector of densities
of individuals adopting a certain pure strategy, where pi is
the fraction of the population using strategy i ∈ K. However
the original formulation of evolutionary game theory were
not required to make distinction between population-level and
individual-level variability for infinite population [7].
Let now focus on the case of monomorphic populations
in which each individual uses a mixed strategy. We define
by J(p,q) the expected payoff for a tagged individual if it
uses a mixed action p when meeting another individual who
adopts the mixed action q. This payoff is called ”fitness” and
actions with larger fitness are expected to propagate faster in
a population. If we define a payoff matrix A and consider p
and q to be column vectors, then J(p,q) = p′Aq and the
payoff function J is indeed linear in p and q. A mixed action
q is called a Nash equilibrium if
∀p ∈ ∆(K), J(q,q) ≥ J(p,q) (1)
In evolutionary games the most important concept of
equilibrium is the ESS, which was introduced by [7] as a
strategy that, if adopted by most members of a population,
it is not invadable by mutant strategies in its suitably small
neighbourhood. More precisely, we suppose that the whole
population uses a strategy q and that a small fraction ǫ of
individuals (mutants) adopts another strategy p. Evolutionary
forces are expected to select q against p if
J(q, ǫp+ (1− ǫ)q) > J(p, ǫp+ (1− ǫ)q) (2)
The definition of ESS is thus related to a robustness property
against deviations by a whole (possibly small) fraction of the
population. This is an important difference that distinguishes
the equilibrium in populations as seen by biologists and the
standard Nash equilibrium often used in economic context, in
which robustness is defined against the possible deviation of a
single user. Why do we need the stronger type of robustness?
Since we deal with large populations, it is likely to expect that
from time to time, some group of individuals may deviate.
Thus robustness against deviations by a single user is not
sufficient to ensure that deviations will not develop and end
up being used by a growing portion of the population. By
defining the ESS through the following equivalent definition
[16, Proposition 2.1] or [6, Theorem 6.4.1, page 63], it’s
possible to establish the relationship between ESS and Nash
Equilibrium (NE). Strategy q is an ESS if it satisfies the two
conditions:
• Nash equilibrium condition:
J(q,q) ≥ J(p,q) ∀p ∈ K. (3)
• Stability condition:
J(p,q) = J(q,q) ⇒ J(p,p) < J(q,p). ∀p 6= q
(4)
The first condition (3) is the condition for a Nash equilibrium.
In fact, if condition (3) is satisfied, then the fraction of
mutations in the population will tend to decrease (as it has
a lower fitness, meaning a lower growth rate). Thus the action
q is then immune to mutations. If it does not but if still the
condition (4) holds, then a population using q is ”weakly”
immune against mutants using p. Indeed, if the mutant’s
population grows, then we shall frequently have individuals
with action q competing with mutants. In such cases, the
condition J(p,p) < J(q,p) ensures that the growth rate of
the original population exceeds that of the mutants. Then an
ESS is a refinement of the Nash equilibrium.
III. NEW NATURAL CONCEPT ON EVOLUTIONARY GAMES
In this section we present a new concept for evolutionary
games, in which the idea of the player as a single individual
is substituted by that of a player as a whole group of
individuals. The interactions are among individuals but the
objective function, which is maximized, is that of the group
they belong to. We assume that the population is composed
of N groups, Gi, i = 1, 2, .., N , where the normalized size of
Gi is noted by αi with
∑N
j=1 αi = 1.
For clarity of presentation, we restrict our analysis to
pairwise interactions, where each individual can meet a
member of its own group or of a different one. Individuals
dispose of a finite set of actions: K = {a1, a2, .., aM}. Let pik
be the probability that an individual in the group Gi choses
an action ak ∈ K; we associate to each group i the vector
of probabilities pi = (pi1, pi2, .., piM ) where
∑M
l=1 pil = 1.
By assuming that each individual can interact with another
individual with equal probability, then the expected utility of
a group (player) i is:
Ui(pi,p−i) =
N∑
j=1
αjJ(pi,pj), (5)
where p−i is the profile strategy of other groups and J(pi,pj)
is the immediate expected reward of an individual player
adopting strategy pi against an opponent playing pj .
A. Group Equilibrium Stable Strategy
The definition of GESS is related to the robustness property
against deviations inside each group. There are two possible
equivalent interpretations of an ǫ− deviation in this context:
1) A small deviation in the strategy by all members of a
group. If the group Gi plays according to strategy qi,
the ǫ− deviation, where ǫ ∈ (0, 1), consists in a shift to
the group’s strategy p¯i = ǫpi + (1− ǫqi);
2) The second is a deviation (possibly) large of a small
number of individuals in a group Gi, that means that
a fraction ǫ of individuals in Gi plays a different strategy
pi.
After an ǫ−deviation under both interpretations the profile
of the whole population becomes αiǫpi + αi(1 − ǫ)qi +∑
j 6=i αjqj . Then the average payoff of group Gi after
mutation is given by:
Ui(p¯i,q−i) =
N∑
j=1
αjJ(p¯i,pj)
= Ui(qi,q−i) + ǫ
2
αiΩ(pi,qi) + ǫ
(
αi(J(pi,qi)
+ J(qi,pi)− 2J(qi,qi)) +
∑
j 6=i
(J(pi,qj)− J(qi,qj)
)
(6)
where Ω(pi,qi) := J(pi,pi)−J(pi,qi)−J(qi,pi))+J(qi,qi).
Definition 1. A strategy q = (q1,q2, ..,qN ) is a GESS if
∀i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, ∀pi 6= qi, there exists some ǫpi ∈ (0, 1),
which may depend on pi, such that for all ǫ ∈ (0, ǫpi)
Ui(p¯i,q−i) < Ui(qi,q−i), (7)
where p¯i = ǫpi + (1− ǫ)qi.
Hence from equation (7), strategy q is a GESS if the two
following conditions hold:
• ∀pi ∈ [0, 1]
M
Fi(pi,q) := αiΩ(pi,qi)−Ui(pi,q−i)+Ui(qi,q−i) ≥ 0,
(8)
• ∃pi 6= qi such that:
If Fi(pi,q) = 0⇒ Ω(pi,qi) < 0 (9)
Remark 1. The condition (9) can be rewritten as
Ui(qi,q−i) > Ui(pi,q−i)
which is exactly the definition of the strict Nash equilibrium
of the game composed by N groups in which each group
maximises its own utility.
B. GESS and standard ESS
Here we analyse the relationship between the standard ESS
and our new concept GESS.
Proposition 1. Consider games whose immedaite expected
reward is symmetric, i.e. J(p,q) = J(q,p). Then any ESS
is a GESS.
Proof: Let q = (q, .., q) be an ESS. Combining the
symmetry of the payoff function and equation (8), we get:
Fi(pi,q) = −
(
αi(J(pi, q) + J(q,pi)− 2J(q, q)
+
∑
j 6=i
αj(J(pi, q)− J(q, q)
)
= −2αi(J(pi, q)− J(q, q))−
∑
j 6=i
αj(J(pi, q)− J(q, q))
= −(1 + αi)(J(pi, q)− J(q, q)) ≥ 0
where the second equality follows from the symmetry of the
payoff function J and the last inequality follows form the
fact that q is an ESS and satisfies (3). This implies that q
satisfies the first condition of GESS (8). Now assume that
Fi(pi, q) = 0 for some pi 6= q, previous equations imply that
J(pi,q) = J(q,q). Thus the second condition (9) becomes
Ω(pi,qi) = J(pi,q) − J(q,q) < 0 which coincide with the
second condition of ESS (4). This completes the proof.
C. Nash equilibrium and GESS
In the classical evolutionary games, the ESS is a refinement
of a Nash equilibrium and we can see that all ESSs are Nash
equilibria but not all Nash equilibria are ESSs. In order to
characterize this relationship in our context, let us define the
game between groups: There are N players in which each
player has a finite set of pure strategies K = {1, 2, ..,m}.
We define by Ui(qi,q−i) the utility of player i when using
mixed strategy qi against a population of players using q−i =
(q1, . . . ,qi−1,qi+1, . . . ,qN ).
Definition 2. A strategy q = (q1,q2, ..,qN ) is a Nash
Equilibrium if ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , N}
Ui(qi,q−i) ≥ Ui(pi,q−i) (10)
for every other mixed strategy pi 6= qi . If it holds for strict
inequality, then q is a strict Nash equilibrium.
From the definition of the strict Nash equilibrium, it is easy
to show that any strict Nash equilibrium is a GESS defined in
equation (7). But in our context, we address several questions
on the relationship between the GESS, ESS and the Nash
equilibrium defined in (10). For simplicity of presentation, we
restrict to the case of two-strategies games. Before studying
them, we introduce here some definitions that are needed in
the sequel.
Definition 3. • A fully mixed strategy q is a strategy such
that all actions of each group have to receive a positive
probability, i.e., 0 < qij < 1 ∀(i, j) ∈ I × K.
• A mixer (pure) group i is the group that uses a mixed
(pure) strategy 0 < qi < 1 (resp. qi ∈ {0, 1}).
• An equilibrium with mixed and non mixed strategies is
an equilibrium in which there is at least one pure group
and a mixer group.
IV. ANALYSIS OF N -GROUPS GAMES WITH TWO
STRATEGIES
We will discuss here N -groups games with two strategies.
The two possible pure strategies are A and B and the pairwise
interactions payoff matrix is given by:
P =
(A B
A a b
B c d
)
,
where Pij , i, j = A, B is the payoff of the first (row)
individual if it plays strategy i against the second (column)
individual playing strategy j. We assume that both individuals
are the same and hence payoffs of the column player are given
by the transposed of P . According to the definition of GESS,
q is a GESS if it satisfies the conditions (8)-(9), which can be
rewritten as:
• ∀pi ∈ [0, 1], i = 1, .., N :
Fi(pi,q) = (qi − pi)
(
αi(J(qi, 1) − J(qi, 0)) +
N∑
j=1
αj(J(1, qj)− J(0, qj))
)
≥ 0
(11)
• If F (pi,q) = 0 for some pi 6= qi, then:
(pi − qi)
2∆ < 0 =⇒ ∆ < 0 (12)
where ∆ = a− b− c+ d.
A. Characterisation of fully mixed GESS
In this section we are interested in characterising the full
mixed GESS q. According to (11), a full mixed equilibrium
q = (q1, . . . , qN ) is a GESS if it satisfies the condition (12)
where the equality must holds for all p ∈ [0, 1]. This yields to
the following equation: ∀i = 1, . . .N ,
αi(J(qi, 1) − J(qi, 0)) +
N∑
j=1
αj(J(1, qj)− J(0, qj)) = 0
which can be rewritten as
αi∆qi + b− d+ αi(c− d) + ∆
N∑
j=1
αjqj = 0
This leads to the following expression of the mixed GESS:
q∗i =
d− b+
(
(1 +N)αi − 1
)
(d− c)
(N + 1)αi∆
; (13)
Proposition 2. If ∆ < 0 and 0 < q∗i < 1, i = 1, . . . , N , then
there exists a unique fully mixed GESS equilibrium given by
(13).
We note that the fully mixed GESS is a strict Nash
equilibrium since the condition (12) is equivalent to the
definition of the strict Nash equilibrium (see remark 1) under
the condition F (p, q1, . . . , qN ) = 0, ∀p ∈ [0, 1].
B. Characterisation of strong GESS
We call a strong GESS an equilibrium that satisfies the strict
inequality (11) for all groups. Similarly to the fully mixed
GESS, we present here the condition for the existence of a
strong GESS. Note that all groups have to use pure strategy
in a strong GESS. Without loss of generality, we assume
that a pure strong GESS can be represented by nA, where
nA ∈ {1, ..., N} denotes that the nA first groups use A pure
strategy and remaining N − nA groups chose strategy B. For
example nA = N (resp. nA = 0) means that all groups choose
pure strategy A (resp. B).
Proposition 3. If a 6= c or b 6= d, then every N-player
game with two strategies has a GESS. There are the following
possibilities for the strong GESS:
i. If a − c > maxi(αi) · (b − a) then nA = N is a strong
GESS;
ii. If b−d < mini(αi)(d−c) then nA = 0 is a strong GESS;
iii. Let H(na) :=
∑nA
j=1 αj(a − c) +
∑N
j=nA+1
αj(b − d).
If αi(d − c) > H(na) > αi(b − a) then nA is a strong
GESS.
Proof: In order to prove that a strategy nA = N is a
GESS, we have to impose the strict inequality, i.e.: ∀pi 6=
1 for i ∈ {1, .., nA} and ∀pi 6= 0 for i ∈ {nA + 1, .., N}
Fi(pi, 1nA , 0N−nA) > 0
We show here conditions of the existence only for nA = N
since the others one straightforward follow from the symmetry
of the players in the game.
Consider now that (nA = N ) is a strong GESS. The
inequality (11) becomes: ∀pi 6= 1, ∀i
(pi−1)
(
αi(a−b)+
N∑
j=1
αj(a−c)
)
= (pi−1)
(
αi(a−b)+a−c)
)
< 0,
Since pi < 1, one has αi(b−a) < a− c ∀i. This completes
the proof of (i). To show conditions of the other strong GESSs,
we follow the lines of the proof of (i).
C. Characterisation of weak GESS
We call a weak GESS an equilibrium in which at least one
group uses a strategy that satisfies the condition (12) with
equality. Here we distinguish two types of equilibrium: the
equilibrium with no mixer group and the equilibrium with
mixer and no mixer groups. Conditions for the equilibrium
with no mixed strategy are given by Proposition 3 with at
the least one group satisfing it with equality and ∆ < 0. In
this section we focus only on the equilibrium with mixer and
no mixer groups. Without loss of generality, we assume that
an equilibrium with mixed and non mixed strategies, can be
represented by (nA, nB,q) where nA denotes that group i for
i = 1.., nA (resp. i = nA + 1, .., nA + nB) uses strategy A
(resp. B). The remaining groups N − nA − nB are mixers in
which qi is the probability to choose the strategy A by group
i.
Proposition 4. Let either a 6= c or b 6= d and ∆ < 0.
(nA, nB,q) is a weak GESS if:


αi∆+ d− b+ αi(c− d) + ∆(αnA + y) ≥ 0, i = 1, .., nA
d− b+ αi(c− d) +∆(αnA + y) ≤ 0, i = nA + 1, .., nB
qi =
d−b+αi(d−c)−y∆
∆αi
, i = nA + nB + 1, .., N
(14)
where y =
(N−nA−nB)(d−b−
∑nA
j=1 αj)+(d−c)
∑N
j=nA+nB+1
αj
∆(N−NA−nB+1)
.
Proof: We assume that (nA, nB,q) is GESS. From the
condition (11) we get


αi∆+ b− d+ αi(c− d) + ∆y > 0, i = 1, .., nA
b− d+ αi(c− d) +∆y < 0, i = nA + 1, .., nB
αi∆qi + b− d+ αi(c− d) +∆y = 0, i = nA + nB + 1, .., N
(15)
where y =
∑N
i=1 αjqj . To compute qi, i = nA+nB+1, .., N ,
we add the N−nA−nB last equations’ left hand sides together
in (15), which gives:
∆y−∆αnA
+(N−na−nB)(b−d)+(c−d)·
N∑
j=nA+nB+1
αj+∆(N−na−nB)y = 0
(16)
Thus:
y =
(N − nA − nB)(d − b) + ∆αnA
+ (d − c)
∑N
j=nA+nB+1
αj
∆(N −NA − nB + 1)
(17)
This agrees with (14), completing the proof of the proposition.
V. SOME EXAMPLES
In this section we analyze a number of examples with two
players and two strategies.
A. Hawk and Dove Game
One of the most studied examples in EG theory is the Hawk-
Dove game, first introduced by Maynard Smith and Price in
”The Logic of Animal Conflict”. In this game two animals
compete for a resource of a fixed value. Each animal follows
one of two strategies, Hawk or Dove, where Hawk corresponds
to an aggressive behavior, Dove to a non-aggressive one. If
two Hawks meet, they fight and one of them gets the resource
while the other is injured, with equal probability. A Hawk
always wins against a Dove, whereas if two Doves meet they
equally share the resource. The payoff matrix of the game is
the following:
( H D
H 12 (V − C) V
D 0 V/2
)
where C represent the cost of the fight, and V is the benefit
the palyer get from the resource. We suppose that C > V .
In standard GT, this example belongs to the anti-
coordination class, whose games always have two strict, pure
strategy NEs and one non-strict, mixed strategy NE. In this
case the two pure equilibria are (H,D) and (D,H), and the
mixed-one is given by: q∗ = V
C
. The latter is the only ESS:
even if the two pure NE are strict, being asymmetric they can’t
be ESSs. We set V = 2 and C = 3 and study this game in
groups framework, considering two groups of size α and 1−α.
We obtain that the GESSs and the strict NE always
coincides. In particular we observe that:
• for 0 < α < 0.25 the game has one strong GESS (H,D)
and a weak GESS (H, q2) ;
• for 0.25 < α < 0.37: one weak GESS (H, q2);
• for 0.37 < α < 0.5 one weak GESS, (q∗1 , q∗2);
The size of groups has a strong impact on the beahvior
of players: in the first interval of α−values we remark that
the GESS is not unique; when increasing the size of the
first group, and thus decreasing that of the second one, the
probability that the second group plays aggressively against the
pure aggressive strategy of the first one increases until we get
into the third interval, where both players are mixers. Here we
can clearly observe that the equilibrium q∗1 is decreasing in α:
as we supposed that an individual can interact with members of
its own group, when increasing α, the probability of meeting
an individual in the same group increases and it leads to a less
aggressive behavior.
B. Stag Hunt Game
We now consider a well-known example which belongs to
the coordination class, the Stag Hunt game. The story behind
has been described by J-J. Rousseau: two individuals go out
on a hunt; if they cooperate they can hunt a stag; otherwise,
hunting alone, a hunter can only get e hare, so collaboration is
rewarding for players. It represents a conflict between social
and safely cooperation. The payoff matrix is the following:
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)
where S and H stand respectively for Stag and Hare and
a > c ≥ d > b. Coordination games have two strict,
pure strategy NEs and one non-strict, mixed strategy NE,
respectively the risk dominant equilibrium (H,H), the payoff
dominant one (S, S) and the mixed symmetric one with
q∗1 = q
∗
2 =
d−b
a−b−c+d .
We set a = 2, b = 0, c = 1, d = 1 and we look for the
equilibria of the two groups gama as a function of α. We find
that the strict GESSs and the strict NEs don’t coincide, as
we found strategies, which are strict GESSs but not NEs. The
two-groups Stag-Hunt Game only have the pure-pure strict NE
(S, S), for all values of α, whereas, for the GESSs we find
that:
• for 0 < α < 0.5 the game admits two pure-pure strong
GESSs: (S, S) and (H,H);
• for 0.25 < α < 0.5 the game admits three pure-pure
strong GESSs: (S, S) and (H,H) and (S,H);
• the game doesn’t admit any strict mixed NE.
C. Prisoner’s Dilemma
We consider another classical example in game theory, the
Prisoner’s Dilemma, which belongs to a third kind of games,
the pure dominance class.
Two criminals are arrested and separately interrogated: they
can either accuse the other, either remain silent. If both of
them accuse the other (defect) , they will be both imprisoned
for 2 years. If only one accuse the other, the accused is
imprisoned for 3 years while the other is free. If both remain
silent (cooperate), each of them will serve one year in jail.
The payoff matrix is the following:
(C D
C a b
D c d
)
where C and D stand respectevely for collaboration and
defection and where c > a > d > b.
In standard GT, pure dominance class games admit a unique
pure, strict and symmetric NE, which also is the unique ESS;
in the Prisoner’s Dilemma it’s (D,D).
We set a = 2, b = 0, c = 3, d = 1 and we study the
two-groups corresponding game. As in the previous example,
we find strict GESSs which are not strict NEs. In particular,
we have that:
• (C,C) is always a GESS and a strict NE for all values
of α;
• (D,D) is a GESS for all values of α but it is never a
strict NE;
• (C,D) (symmetrically (D,C) ) is always a GESS and a
strict NE for 0.5 < α < 1 (symmetrically 0 < α < 0.5);
• the game doesn’t admit mixed GESSs;
The two groups game thus admits three pure GESSs and
two pure strict NEs for all values of α.
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Fig. 3. Total rate of collaboration for different GESSs as a function of group
1 size α in the prisoner’s Dilemma
VI. MULTIPLE ACCESS CONTROL
In this section we briefly introduce a refinement of our
model, which will be further developed in future works. We
modify the group utility function defined in (5) by supposing
that the immediate payoff matrix differs if the interacting
individuals belong to the same group or to two different ones.
The utility function of a group i playing qi against a
population profile q−i can be written as follows:
U(qi,q−i) = αiK(qi,qi) +
∑
j 6=i
αiJ(qi,qj), (18)
where K(p,q) indicates the immediate expected payoff of an
individual playing p against a member of its own group using q
, whereas J(p,q) is the immediate expected payoff associated
to interactions among individuals of different groups.
We present a particular application of this model in Aloha
system in which a large population of mobiles interfere with
each other through many local pairwise interactions. We
assume that the population is decomposed into N groups Gi,
i = 1, 2, .., N of normalized size αi with
∑N
j=1 αi = 1.
Mobiles are randomly placed over a plane and matched
through pairwise interactions where each mobile decides
either to transmit (T ) or to not transmit (S) a packet to
a receiver when they are within transmission range of each
other. Interferences occur as in the Aloha protocol: if more
than one neighbor of a receiver transmits a packet at the same
time then there is a collision and the transmission fails. The
channel is ideal for transmission and all errors are due to
collisions. Let µ be the probability that a mobile k has its
receiver R(k) within its range. When a mobile k transmits,
all mobiles within a circle of radius R centered at node R(k)
cause interference to k for its transmission to R(k), so that
more than one transmission within a distance R of the receiver
in the same slot cause a collision and the loss of mobile’s i
packet at R(k).
A mobile of group i may use a mixed strategy pi =
(pi, 1 − pi) where pi is the probability to choose the action
(T ). Let γ denotes the probability that a mobile is alone in a
given local interaction and the tagged mobile does not know
whether there is another transmitting mobile within its range
of transmission.
Let P1 (resp. P2) be the immediate payoff matrix of
interactions among individuals belonging to the same group
(resp. of two different ones):
P1 ≡
( T S
T −2δ 1− δ
S 1− δ 0
)
, P2 ≡
(T S
T δ 1− δ
S 0 0
)
.
where 0 < δ < 1 is the cost of transmission. The definition of
P1 implies that when two mobiles of the same group i interact,
any successful transmission is equally rewarding for the group
i. The resulting expected payoff functions of a mobile playing
qi against a member belonging to its own group and to a
different one, using respectively the same strategy qi and a
different one qj are the following:
K(qi,qi) = µ [qi[γ(1− δ) + (1− γ)((1− δ)(1− qi)− 2δqi)]
+(1− γ)(1− δ)(1− qi)qi]
= µqi[(1− δ)(2− γ)− 2(1− γ)qi]
J(qi,qj) = µqi[γ(1− δ) + (1− γ)((1− δ)(1− qj)− δqj ]
= µqi[1− δ − (1− γ)qj ]
The expected throughput of group i is then given by:
U(qi,q−i) = µqi[1− δ + (1− γ)(αi(1− δ − qi)−
N∑
j=1
αjqj)]
(19)
By following the same analysis as in section III, the strategy
q is a GESS if ∀i = 1, . . .N the two following conditions are
satisfied:
1) F ′i (pi,q) ≡ (qi − pi)[1− δ + (1− γ)(αi(1− δ − 2qi)−∑N
j=1 αjqj)] ≥ 0 ∀pi,
2) If F ′i (pi,q) = 0 for some pi 6= qi, then (pi − qi)2(1 −
γ)αi > 0 ∀pi 6= qi.
We observe that the inequality (pi − qi)2(1 − γ)αi > 0
holds for all values of the parameters which implies that the
second condition is always satisfied and that the first condition
is sufficient to guarantee the existence of a GESS. In the
following proposition we give a characterization of the GESSs
of the presented MAC game. Without loss of generality, we
reorder the groups so that α1 ≤ α2 . . . ≤ αN .
Proposition 5. We find that:
• The pure symmetric strategy (S, . . . , S) is never a GESS.
• If a fixed group Gi adopts pure strategy T , then at the
equilibrium, all smaller groups transmit. If the bigger
group GN use strategy T at the equilibrium, then γ ≥ γ¯.
• If a fixed group Gi adopts pure strategy S, then at the
equilibrium, all smaller groups also use S.
• If a fixed group Gi adopts an equilibrium mixed strategy
qi ∈]0, 1[, then if qi > 1−δ2 , at the equilibrium all smaller
groups use pure strategy T , whereas if qi < 1−δ2 , smaller
groups play S.
• The game admits a unique fully mixed GESS q∗ =
(q∗1 , . . . , q
∗
N ), given by:
q
∗
i =
(1− δ)(1 + γ + (1− γ)(2 +N)αi)
2(N + 2)(1− γ)αi
(20)
under the condition: γ < γ.
The thresholds γ and γ¯ are defined as follows:
γ ≡ min
αi
αi(N + 2)(1 + δ)− (1− δ)
αi(N + 2)(1 + δ) + (1 + δ)
,
γ¯ ≡ max
αi
(
1−
1− δ
αi(δ + 1) + 1
)
.
Proof: A strategy q = (q1, . . . , qN ) is a GESS if ∀i =
1, . . . , N , the condition F ′i (pi,q) ≥ 0 is verified ∀pi ∈ [0, 1].
• If qi = 0 ∀i⇒ Fi(pi,0) = −pi[1−δ+(1−γ)(1−δ)αi <
0 ∀pi, which proves that (S, . . . , S) is never a GESS.
• Let q be a GESS such that qi = 1 for a fixed i. This
implies that 1 − δ − (1 − γ)(αi(1 + δ) + Y ] ≥ 0, with
Y =
∑N
j=1 αjqj). Then, if αj < αi we have that
1−δ−(1−γ)(αj(1+δ)+Y ] ≥ 1−δ−(1−γ)(αi(1+δ)+
Y ] ≥ 0 and thus qj = 1 satisfy the GESS condition. If
all the groups transmit, then the condition for the GESS
is satisfied iff ∀i : 1 − δ − (1 − γ)((1 + δ)αi − 1) ≥ 0,
and thus γ ≥ 1− 1−δ
αi(δ+1)+1
.
• Let q be a GESS such that qi = 0 for a fixed i. This
implies that 1 − δ + (1 − γ)(αi(1 − δ) − Y ] ≤ 0.
If αj < αi, 1 − δ + (1 − γ)(αij(1 − δ) − Y ] ≤
1−δ+(1−γ)(αi(1−δ)−Y ] ≤ 0 and thus F ′j(pi,q) ≥ 0.
• Let q be a GESS such that qi ∈]0, 1[ for a fixed i.Then,
if for a j < i, qj = 0 (resp. 1), F ′j(pi,q) ≥ 0 implies
that qi > 1−δ2 (resp. qi > 1−δ2 ).
• Let q be a fully mixed GESS. Then, ∀i: 1 − δ + (1 −
γ)(αi(1−δ−2qi)−Y ) = 0. After some albebra we thus
obtain that Y = (1−δ)(N+1−γ)(1−γ)(N+2) , and by substituting it in
the previos equations we obtain the expressions of qi. By
imposing that 0 < qi < 1 ∀i we obtain the condition
γ < γ.
As an example, we consider a two groups MAC game, in
which we fix a low value of the cost of transmission, δ = 0.2,
and groups’ sizes α1 = α = 0.4, α2 = 1 − α = 0.6,
and we vary the value of the parameter γ. The game admits
three different equilibria, depending on γ: a fully mixed
GESS q∗M , a pure GESS q∗P , and a pure-mixed one q∗PM .
In figure 4 we consider the fully mixed and the pure GESS.
We have that for γ < γ = 0.3 the game admits a GESS
q∗q∗M = (q
∗
1 , q
∗
2), whose components are plotted. Then, for
γ = γ¯ > 0.53, q∗q∗P = (T, T ). We also plot the value of
q∗std := min(1,
1
1−γ −∆. We note that fully mixed equilibrium
strategies adopted by the two groups, q∗1 , q∗2 , are both lower
then q∗std.
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Fig. 4. The value of the equilibrium strategy q∗1 and q∗2 in a two groups
MAC game as a function of γ for α = 0.4 compared to q∗
std
.
In figure 5 we plotted the value of the second component of
the pure-mixed GESS of the game: (T, qT ), which exists only
for 0 ≤ γ < 0.4, and we compare it to q∗std. We note that,
for the second group the probability of transmitting is always
lower than in the standar game, whereas
Let pS(p) be the probability of a successful transmission
in a population under profile p. For N = 2, we have:
pS(p) = µ[γ(αp1 + (1− α)p2)] + (1− γ)(2α
2
p1(1− p1)+
+ α(1− α)((1− p2)p1 + (1− p1)p2) + 2(1− α)
2
p2(1− p2))].
In figure 6 we plotted the value of p∗S = pS(q∗M ) as a
function of γ for α = 0.4. We note that, γ < γ, even if in
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Fig. 5. The value of the equilibrium strategy q∗2 of the second group in the
pure-mixed equilibrium (T, qT ) as a function of γ for α = 0.85 compared
to q∗
std
.
the groups game the probability to transmit is lower at the
equilibrium.
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Fig. 6. The probability pS(q∗M ) of a successful transmission for the fully
mixed GESS in a two groups MAC game at the equilibrium as a function of
γ .
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this work we presented a new concept of Evolutionarily
Stable Strategy in a group-players framework, the GESS,
exploring its relation with the Nash equilibrium and with the
standard ESS. By analyzing some examples of two players
and two strategies games, we observed how the presence
of groups impacts the behavior of individuals and changes
the structure of the equilibria. We then introduce a slightly
different situation by redefining the utility of a group, in
such a way to consider different utilities for interactions
among members of the same group or of a different one.
Through a MAC example we showed how the presence of
groups can favor cooperative behaviors. There are still many
issues open for future studies. We are now studying the
replicator dynamics in the group-players population in order
to investigate the relation between our GESS and the rest point
of such dynamics. At the theoretical level, we want to further
deepen the study of the utility of a group, considering selfish
and altruistic components.
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